Karol Kubrak Do reflectiveness and religiosity matter when you don’t believe in free will? An analysis of the impact of a deterministic worldview on prosocial behavior

Author's note:

Karol Kubrak¹

¹ Jan Kochanowski University of Kielce, Poland

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6141-0754

karol.kubrak@ujk.edu.pl

Introduction

In most everyday situations, we operate under the belief that we have control over our actions and can make free choices. For example, choosing between coffee and tea in
a restaurant seems intuitively controlled, and we feel that the final decision is free from any coercion. This intuitive approach to free will is shared by most people (Baumeister et al., 2009; Nahmias et al., 2005).

The discussion on human free will gained increased attention with the development of neuroscience. Some of the most frequently cited studies on this topic are those conducted by Libet and colleagues (1993; 1983) using electroencephalography, in which participants were instructed to perform a simple hand movement. Their findings revealed that the decision to move was determined by brain activity before the participants became consciously aware of their choice, opening the door to the argument that free will may be an illusion (Bremer, 2010). Reports from similar experiments further fueled the debate, leading to growing skepticism regarding the existence of free will (Caruso, 2021; Harris, 2012; Wegner, 2002).

However, the significant interest in this topic extended beyond a mere academic dispute. As Sam Harris writes in the introduction to his book:

„The question of free will touches nearly everything we care about. Morality, law, politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, feelings of guilt and personal accomplishment – most of what is distinctly human about our lives seems to depend upon our viewing one another as autonomous persons, capable of free choice” (2012, p.1).

We can see, therefore, that our beliefs about free will serve as a foundation for judging both our own actions and the behavior of others. This, in turn, is closely linked to our understanding of moral responsibility and the justification for the existence of criminal justice systems (Dennett & Caruso, 2021; Kaposy, 2009). The significance of belief in free will appears to be crucial, suggesting that a shift in these beliefs could have substantial consequences for an individual's functioning in society.

Psychological consequences of weakening belief in free will

The existence of free will is primarily a philosophical debate yet psychological science has long investigated how decisions are made under various internal and external constraints. Research in decision-making and action control shows that choices, though influenced by numerous factors, often involve subjective experience of agency and responsibility, which are central to how people perceive and enact free will (Baumeister, 2008).

Whether free will exists falls beyond the scope of this study and will not be resolved here. However, it is worth examining the consequences of beliefs about the absence of free will on human functioning. As interest in this topic has grown, questions have arisen regarding the social and psychological consequences of such beliefs. The first studies addressing this issue were conducted by Vohs and Schooler (2008). The authors instructed one group of participants to read a passage from a book promoting a deterministic worldview, while the other group read a text suggesting that individuals have significant control over their choices. In the next stage of the experiment, participants completed a computerized test in which they had the opportunity to cheat. The results showed that those who had read the deterministic passage were more likely to cheat during the test.

Shortly thereafter, further research demonstrated that exposure to deterministic texts not only reduced the willingness to help others but also increased participants' tendency toward aggressive behavior (Baumeister et al., 2009). This led to the hypothesis that belief in free will influences self-control processes, which are associated with certain cognitive and energetic costs. If individuals believe they have no real control over their actions, they may be less willing to exert effort to regulate their impulses, resulting in reduced inhibitory control (Rigoni et al., 2012).

Over time, research has provided a broader perspective on the consequences of weakening belief in free will. Studies have shown that weakening belief in free will increases racial prejudice (X. Zhao et al., 2014) and reduces cooperative behavior (Protzko et al., 2016). Other findings suggest that a diminished belief in free will leads to increased conformity (Alquist et al., 2013), lower feelings of gratitude (MacKenzie et al., 2014), decreased sense of life meaning (Moynihan et al., 2019), and reduced overall life satisfaction (M. Zhao & Huo, 2022).

The initial body of research suggested that a lack of belief in free will reduces prosocial behaviors and is associated with negative consequences for individuals. On the other hand, some studies indicated that believing in free will could also have negative consequences. One such finding comes from research showing that belief in free will is linked to a stronger tendency to attribute moral responsibility to others for their actions (Shariff et al., 2014). Additionally, belief in free will was found to be a predictor of retributive punishment (Shariff et al., 2014). It can therefore be argued that the more a person believes that individuals fully control their choices and can act as they wish, the more likely they are to assign blame to others for certain events and expect retribution for wrongdoing. For example, research has shown that belief in free will is positively correlated with the tendency to blame individuals for developing mental illnesses such as schizophrenia (Chandrashekar, 2020). Another study found that belief in free will is associated with the perception that people deserve what happens to them, leading to victims of crimes being seen as responsible for the harm they have suffered (Genschow & Vehlow, 2021).

Over a decade of research on the social and individual consequences of changing beliefs about free will has yielded mixed results in terms of costs and benefits for human functioning. On one hand, studies have pointed to an increase in antisocial behaviors among individuals with deterministic beliefs (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008; X. Zhao et al., 2014), as well as a decline in individual well-being and overall functioning (Moynihan et al., 2019; M. Zhao & Huo, 2022). On the other hand, belief in free will has been shown to encourage blaming victims for their circumstances (Chandrashekar, 2020; Genschow & Vehlow, 2021; Shariff et al., 2014), which can also be interpreted as
a negative consequence.

A recent meta-analysis provided a comprehensive review of existing research on belief in free will and challenged the negative portrayal of deterministic beliefs (Genschow et al., 2023). The researchers examined 145 experiments, 95 of which were unpublished. The unpublished results were obtained through responses from original study authors to data requests sent by the meta-analysis authors via international mailing lists. Most importantly, the data analysis confirmed that experimental manipulation of beliefs can indeed weaken belief in free will. This means that commonly used research methods, such as presenting participants with excerpts from books that strongly promote determinism, can effectively alter individuals' convictions (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). However, based on the collected data, the researchers concluded that weakening belief in free will does not have a significant impact on antisocial behaviors. Similar findings applied to the lack of influence of deterministic beliefs on tendencies toward cheating, conformity, and punitive attitudes. The researchers, however, did not have enough data to analyze variables such as gratitude (MacKenzie et al., 2014) or sense of life meaning (Moynihan et al., 2019).

The current state of knowledge on the impact of weakened belief in free will on individual functioning presents a complex and inconclusive picture. A lack of belief in free will most likely does not have a significant effect on the prosocial behavior of most people. However, further research is needed to account for additional variables that could explain specific differences in behavioral changes.

Current research and hypothesis

The findings discussed in the previous section open the door to new interpretations and the consideration of additional variables. Therefore, this study will take an exploratory approach.

The main objective of this study is to analyze the impact of deterministic beliefs on prosocial behavior while considering mediating effects. This direction of interpretation is based on the latest research that incorporates additional variables to examine the influence of deterministic beliefs on prosocial behavior (Genschow, 2024; St Quinton et al., 2023). For example, it has been established that belief in dualism, rather than belief in free will, is
a better predictor of prosociality (Genschow, 2024). Since belief in dualism is often associated with belief in entities such as the soul , it is reasonable to interpret this relationship in the context of religiosity. Research suggests, for instance, that religious individuals are more likely to endorse the existence of free will, which in turn influences their moral and social attitudes (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). While the relationship between religiosity and prosociality is not entirely clear, most studies indicate that religiosity enhances prosocial behavior in certain contexts, particularly within one’s own community (Kelly et al., 2024; Tsang et al., 2021). Specifically, generosity–as a form of prosocial behavior–has often been linked to religiosity (Pettit et al., 2022; Rapert et al., 2021; Schnitker et al., 2020). Thus, it appears that religiosity may serve as a potential mediating factor between belief in free will and prosociality.

Another factor that may explain the impact of deterministic beliefs on behavior is susceptibility to impulses. As previous research has shown, weakening beliefs in free will has been linked to reduced self-control (Rigoni & Brass, 2013). According to this interpretation, individuals who perceive their actions as determined may be less willing to exert effort to regulate their impulses. In psychological literature, susceptibility to impulses is referred to as impulsivity, which is defined as a fast and automatic thinking style (Kahneman, 2011). Impulsivity corresponds to what is known as System 1, a term introduced by Stanovich and West (2000). Its opposite is reflectiveness, which corresponds to System 2–a thinking style that operates slowly, requires focus, and is characterized by rational decision-making.

Individuals can be described as either impulsive or reflective depending on their tendency to rely on System 1 or System 2 in everyday situations. These tendencies lead to significant individual differences. Although reflectiveness has not been directly studied in the context of prosociality, indirect evidence suggests a link. For instance, impulsivity as a trait has been associated with harsher moral judgments (Paxton et al., 2012), stronger intergroup prejudices (Kubrak & Gasparski, 2021), conservative political views (Deppe et al., 2015), and overconfidence in personal judgments (Hoppe & Kusterer, 2011). Therefore, it is worth examining whether higher impulsivity leads to a decrease in prosocial behaviors in response to a weakened belief in free will.

To summarize, the ambiguous findings regarding the impact of disbelief in free will on prosocial behaviors create room for interpretation, particularly when considering two additional variables: religiosity and reflectiveness. Given that religiosity can shape moral and social attitudes, a weakened belief in free will may predispose religious individuals to withdraw from prosocial behaviors. Additionally, impulsivity as a trait may contribute to weakened self-control, leading to a reduction in prosocial behaviors. Based on this reasoning, the following hypotheses were formulated:

H1: Impulsivity (low reflectiveness) will decrease prosocial behaviors in individuals whose belief in free will has been weakened.

H2: Religiosity will decrease prosocial behaviors in individuals whose belief in free will has been weakened.

H3: Religiosity will increase prosocial behaviors in individuals whose belief in free will has been strengthened.

Method

Participants

The study included 240 participants (174 women and 66 men). The participants were adults aged between 18 and 79 years. The mean age was 28.73 (SD = 12.09). 40.0% of the participants lived in rural areas, while the remaining participants lived in cities. Only 1.7% of the participants had primary education, 5.4% had vocational education, 13.3% had secondary education, and 79.6% had higher education or were in the process of studying.

Procedure and Description of Variables

Participants were recruited using convenience sampling; students or available individuals who expressed willingness to participate in the study were invited to take part. Participants were informed that participation in the experiment was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time. The study was conducted in public spaces using the paper-and-pencil method and took the form o one-on-one interviews. Before the procedure began, the interviewers provided each participant with instructions.

Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three groups (control, experimental 1, and experimental 2), differing in initial study conditions. In the control group, participants read neutral scientific texts. In experimental group 1, participants read statements challenging the existence of free will. In experimental group 2, participants read statements reinforcing belief in free will. In experimental group 1, the independent variable was exposure to content denying the existence of free will. In experimental group 2, the independent variable was exposure to content affirming the existence of free will. The moderators were religiosity and reflectiveness. The dependent variable was the level of prosociality. In the first stage, participants were presented with eight different statements described as expert opinions reflecting the current scientific consensus. They were then asked to either rewrite these statements in their own words or copy them verbatim. This procedure aimed to engage participants in carefully processing the given statements.

In the control group, the statements concerned neutral, worldview-independent scientific facts, such as: „Tomatoes contain lycopene, which is beneficial for human health”. In contrast, in the experimental groups, the statements were designed to either strengthen or weaken belief in free will. In experimental group 1 (with a deterministic message, hereafter referred to as the „determinism group”), participants copied statements such as: „All behaviors are determined by brain activity, which in turn is determined by
a combination of environmental and genetic factors” or „Science has shown that free will is an illusion”. In experimental group 2 (with a message reinforcing belief in free will, hereafter referred to as the „free will group”), participants copied statements supporting the notion of free will, such as: „Freedom of choice is directly linked to our conscious awareness of making decisions in the present moment” or “Leading experts worldwide have no doubt that the existence of free will is as certain as the roundness of the Earth”. These techniques have been used in various experiments and have been proven effective in altering beliefs about free will (see Vohs & Schooler, 2008).

Immediately after copying the statements, participants completed a questionnaire measuring the dependent variable: prosocial behavior. Generosity was chosen as an indicator of prosocial behavior, as it represents a key aspect of prosociality in everyday life (Kubrak, 2024). The Interpersonal Generosity Scale (Polish adaptation by Mróz et al., 2024) was used for the assessment. This 10-item questionnaire measures an individual's willingness to share psychological resources, such as time and attention, with others. Participants responded on
a 6-point Likert-type scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree). In the current study, the reliability measured with Cronbach’s alpha for the total score was 0.86.

Next, participants completed the Religious Commitment Inventory-10 (RCI-10-PL) in its Polish adaptation (Polak & Grabowski, 2017). Various questionnaires exist to measure religiosity, but many focus on specific aspects of religious beliefs, leading to different results depending on the religious system in question. However, the RCI (Worthington Jr. et al., 2003) adopts a broad approach, allowing for an assessment of the impact of religiosity on an individual's everyday actions. The RCI-10-PL consists of 10 items, which participants respond to using a 5-point Likert type scale from 1 (strongly disagree or when the statement is completely inaccurate) to 5 (strongly agree or when the statement is completely accurate). In the current study, the reliability measured with Cronbach’s alpha for the total score was 0.93.

Finally, participants completed the Reflective Thinking Indicator, developed by Gasparski (2016). This test includes three original items from Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test (2005), supplemented with 12 additional questions. The test consists of 15 questions, each offering three possible answers. A correct answer is awarded 1 point, while an incorrect one receives 0 points. The higher the total score, the higher the level of reflectiveness. The test has been used in psychological research and has demonstrated good psychometric properties (Gasparski, 2016). In the current study, the reliability measured with Cronbach’s alpha for the total score was 0.73.

The order of questionnaire completion was intentional: prosociality was measured immediately after exposure to the statements about free will to assess its direct impact. In contrast, reflectiveness was measured at the end, as research has shown (Paxton et al., 2012) that completing a cognitive reflection test increases reflectiveness, which could reduce susceptibility to the influence of scientific statements.

Results

The analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics v. 29.0. Basic descriptive statistics were computed, and the normality of the results was verified using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The relationships between the analyzed variables were determined using Pearson's correlation coefficient (r). The three study groups were compared using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Bonferroni post hoc tests. A significance level of α = .05 was adopted. Moderation and moderated moderation models were tested using PROCESS macro by A. Hayes (version 4.2). The significance of effects was estimated using bootstrapping with 5000 samples.

Table 1 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the analyzed variables. The analysis revealed a weak negative correlation between reflectiveness and religiosity in the control group (r = -.28;  p = .012) and a weak positive correlation between generosity and religiosity in the „free will” group (r = .25; p = .023). These results indicate that higher reflectiveness was associated with lower religiosity in the control group, while higher religiosity was linked to greater generosity in the „free will” group. In the „determinism” group, the relationships between variables were statistically insignificant.

Table 1

Pearson's r correlations between generosity, religiosity, and reflectiveness

		Generosity		Religiosity
		r	p	r	p
Control group	Generosity	-
	Religiosity	.04	.716	-
	Reflectiveness	-.06	.605	-.28	.012
Determinism	Generosity	-
	Religiosity	-.01	.894	-
	Reflectiveness	.11	.324	-.08	.451
Free will	Generosity	-
	Religiosity	.25	.023	-
	Reflectiveness	-.06	.621	-.12	.274

Comparison of Groups in Terms of Variables

To determine differences between groups in terms of generosity, religiosity, and reflectiveness, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The analysis revealed significant between-group differences only in the level of religiosity. It was found that religiosity was significantly lower in the control group compared to the determinism group (p = .030). No significant differences were observed between the remaining groups (p > .05).

Table 2

Comparison of groups in terms of generosity, religiosity, and reflectiveness

	Control group (n = 80)		Determinism (n = 80)		Free will   (n = 80)		F	df	p	η²
Variable	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Generosity	48.03	7.20	48.65	6.20	47.33	5.83	0.85	2; 237	.429	.01
Religiosity	22.44	8.55	26.45	10.73	25.49	9.93	3.67	2; 237	.027	.03
Reflectiveness	8.35	3.17	9.03	3.34	8.66	3.11	0.89	2; 237	.413	.01

Moderation and Moderated Moderation Model

It was initially assumed that religiosity and reflectiveness would act as moderators in the relationship between group membership and generosity. To test this, a model with two moderators (Model 2) and a moderated moderation model (Model 3) were examined.

For both Model 2 (X × Reflectiveness: b = .03; SE = .17; p = .834; 95% CI [-.29; .36]; X × Religiosity: b = .06; SE = .06; p = .302; 95% CI [-.05; .17]) and Model 3 (X × Religiosity × Reflectiveness: b = .002; SE = .02; p = .920; 95% CI [-.03; .04]), no significant effects were observed.

Further analyses involved the testing of mediation-moderation models (Model 5) and a series of moderated mediation models (Models 7, 14, 15, 58, and 59). In each of these models, neither the moderation nor the mediation effect yielded statistically significant results.

Discussion

The results illustrate the impact of deterministic statements on prosocial behaviors, with a particular focus on the moderating role of religiosity and reflectiveness. Among all the proposed hypotheses, only H3 was confirmed by the study's findings. In the „free will” group, religiosity was positively correlated with generosity, suggesting that strengthening belief in free will may have increased the influence of religiosity on prosocial behavior, although this effect was weak. A possible mechanism explaining this relationship could involve the activation of attitudes and beliefs associated with one's faith as a result of experimental manipulation (Steg & de Groot, 2010). Thus, belief in free will may serve as a factor promoting generosity among religious individuals.

The remaining hypotheses were not confirmed; neither reflectiveness nor religiosity were significant moderators between the weakening of belief in free will and prosocial behaviors.

It is worth recalling that the initial rationale for analyzing reflectiveness stemmed from research indicating a link between self-control mechanisms and prosocial behavior (Rigoni & Brass, 2013). This led to an exploration of the relationship between these variables in the context of reflective thinking, which is considered a fundamental process for self-control. However, the present study shows that reflectiveness does not significantly impact prosocial behaviors, making it an unsuitable candidate for the role of a moderator in the examined model. Similarly, religiosity was not significantly associated with generosity outside of the „free will” group. H2 proposed that prosocial behaviors would decrease among religious individuals in the „determinism” group, but the results suggest no such relationship. The justification for analyzing religiosity in this study was based on findings indicating that belief in dualism accounts for the decline in prosociality following a reduction in belief in free will (Genschow, 2024). Since belief in dualism is ideologically linked to religiosity, it was reasonable to investigate the relationship between religiosity and prosocial behaviors. However, although religiosity is a broader concept than belief in dualism, it did not explain changes in prosociality in either the control group or the „determinism” group.

Finally, the study’s results challenge the notion that weakened belief in free will has negative consequences for prosocial behavior. This aligns with the findings presented in the introduction (Genschow et al., 2023) and contributes to the broader issue of the replication crisis in psychological research. Based on this experiment, no justification can be made for a link between weakened belief in free will and a decline in prosocial behaviors, as previously suggested by other authors (e.g., Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Instead, the findings of this study are consistent with the latest research (Genschow et al., 2023; Quinton et al., 2023), which highlights no impact of deterministic beliefs on prosociality. Similarly, in this study, participants in the „determinism” group–who read statements questioning the existence of free will–did not exhibit significantly lower levels of prosociality compared to those in the control group. The only differences in prosocial behavior emerged in the „free will” group, but only among religious individuals.

Philosophers such as Smilansky (2000) have suggested that discussions of free will should not be introduced into public discourse due to fears of the negative consequences such beliefs might have on individual behavior. However, in light of the present study, such concerns appear to be unfounded. While early research suggested that weakening belief in free will led to a decline in prosocial behavior, the results of this study indicate that changes in our understanding of the world and our beliefs about free will do not have a significant impact on individual functioning.

As neuroscience continues to advance, it will likely provide further intriguing insights into the nature of consciousness, free will, and the intuitive sense of agency that people experience. Increasingly, popular science publications are introducing the public to skepticism about free will (Harris, 2012; Sapolsky, 2023). Despite initial concerns about the psychological consequences of disbelief in free will, contemporary research, along with the present study, provides no basis for alarm. Therefore, this topic can be safely discussed in areas such as ethics, law, and politics. Science communicators, particularly psychologists and educators, can play a crucial role in responsibly conveying these findings to the public.

Limitations

It is important to consider the potential limitations of this study. First and foremost, participants were selected using convenience sampling, which may result in a non-representative sample. Additionally, the study primarily included young adults, among whom variables such as religiosity, reflectiveness, and prosocial behavior may differ from those in other age groups. Future research with a more diverse sample could provide a more reliable understanding of the relationship between a deterministic worldview and prosocial behaviors.

Furthermore, this study did not measure certain specific variables discussed in the text, such as belief in dualism or level of self-control. Future studies should consider these processes as potential mediating or moderating factors of behavior. For example, measuring the subjective sense of control over decisions could help explain why changes in beliefs do not always translate into changes in prosocial or moral behavior. Integrating these variables would allow for a more precise examination of the impact of beliefs on individual functioning and the identification of factors that protect against the negative effects of undermining free will.

 

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The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Pedagogy and Psychology of Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce. Application No.: 11/2023. Received on 18 January 2024.

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to thank the following students for their assistance in conducting the research: Patrycja Biskup, Agnieszka Mikocka, Jadwiga Mikołajczyk-Frydrych, Dominik Moskal, and Bartosz Pyrz.

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Receipt Date: 16.03.2025

Date after correction: 16.06.2025

Print Acceptance Date: 18.06.2025

The article is available under the terms International 4.0 license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)