Ewa Czerniawska, Paulina Olszak Autobiographical memory and personality: possible relationships

Artykuł jest dostępny na warunkach międzynarodowej licencji 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

We would like to thank Zygmunt Jablonski for all helpful comments to the first version of the article.

Introduction

Autobiographical memory (AM) is always present in our everyday life, informing us who we are, helping in starting and maintaining social relationships, but sometimes also bombarding us with memories which we would prefer to forget.

Do some personality traits predispose to remember certain kinds of events more often than others? The paper discusses the data concerning relations between personality traits and AM.

Structure of autobiographical memory

According to theories, AM contains episodic (who, what, where, when) and semantic (general knowledge, metacognitive reflections, etc.) details (Barry et al., 2022). Both structures are in an interactive and interdependent relationship (Williams et al., 2008). For example a person may know the name of the restaurant he/she visited last year (semantic knowledge), but the memory of this visit contains sensory details, which do not refer to semantic knowledge, for example people met or emotions experienced.

Brewer (1986) proposed a typology of autobiographical memories based on the kind of a memory (single and recurring) and the form of representation (visual or abstractive). He distinguished four kinds of autobiographical memories: personal memory, autobiographical fact, generic personal memory, self-schema. The first refers to a single event, and contains a strong component of visual imagery. The second refers to a single, but abstract information. The third is a product of repeated episodes and contains general images from a lot of similar episodes. The self-schema is based on many experiences related to the self. This is an abstract construct, modifying perception and new information referring to the self.

One of the best known conceptions of the structure of AM is Conway’s model (Conway, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Conway (1996) described three levels of AM: lifetime periods, general events and event-specific knowledge (ESK). The first is the most general and embraces long periods of time. People usually can list main periods from their lives (for example „when I was in secondary school”, „when children were small”). General events represent repeated events (for example „walks by the sea”, „trainings every Saturday”) or single, but prolonged events („holidays in Italy”). This kind of events lasts from days to months. Event-specific knowledge concerns specific events that last from seconds to hours. This kind of autobiographical knowledge contains a lot of sensory-perceptual details. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggested two ways of retrieval: generative and spontaneous. In spontaneous retrieval, an internal or environmental cue evokes immediate activation of ESK. It resembles involuntary memories. In contrast, generative retrieval demands elaborations of cues and engages lifetime periods and/or general events, directing to ESK.

Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) pointed to the role of autobiographical memory in forming the sense of the self. Researchers (Conway et al., 2004; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce) proposed the self-memory system (SMS), which includes the episodic memory system, long-term self and working self. The episodic memory system consists of remembered details of experiences, especially those that are important to individuals' short-term goals. The long-term self includes the autobiographical knowledge base. It is an abstract knowledge that defines the self. The working self is a subset of those schemas that are currently active. This element of SMS is closely related to the achievement of goals important for the individual. Goals determine the search for autobiographical knowledge, making access to certain contents easier and to others more difficult. In the long run, only those memories that are important to the individual's long-term goals are remembered. The connections between the working self and the long-term self may be bidirectional. On the one hand, if a memory seems important to the goal, it may be incorporated into autobiographical knowledge. On the other hand, new events through autobiographical reasoning can initiate a new look at oneself and goals that shape the working self.

Memory, including AM, is constructive, not reproductive (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1967). When recalling memories, we usually do not retrieve an exact image of the event, but construct it based on knowledge and schemas. Narrative schemas seem to be particularly important in AM.

The role of emotions in AM

AM is strongly related to emotions. People remember positive and negative events better than neutral and memories of these events are vivid and durable (Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Williams, Ford & Kensinger, 2022).

Emotional experiences are considered in two dimensions: valence and intensity. The first is a continuum describing how negative or positive an event is, whereas the second refers to the degree of subjective excitement or arousal associated with the event (e.g. Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Salgado & Kingo, 2019). According to Taylor (1991), threatening events require quick responses, therefore negative stimuli evoke strong emotions to deal with threatening situation quickly and effectively. After that arousal declines, positive illusions (e.g. overly positive conception of the self) are restored what help functioning in a non-threatening environment.

Many data support such a mechanism. People recall more positive events than negative (e.g. Thompson et al., 1996), but negative experiences evoke stronger physiological, affective, cognitive and social-behavioural reactions (Taylor, 1991). Strong negative emotions are easier to evoke than positive ones, but the intensity of negative events falls faster than positive (e.g. Skowronski et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2022). Although both negative and positive memories seem to be vivid and durable, it may be the result of different processes. Negative or threatening content attracts more attention what in turn selectively enhances memory. Consequently, central details are remembered better than the context of situation (Easterbrook, 1959; Mather & Sutherland, 2011; Williams et al., 2022). Memory for positive events contains less specific details, but more contextual information what helps to conserve memories more vivid and reexperienced. Williams et al. (2022) suggest that the vividness and specificity of negative memories is more dependent on arousal, in contrast to memories of positive experiences.

Personality

The concept of personality is understood in various ways depending on the theoretical contexts: psychodynamic, phenomenological, trait, behavioural, cognitive, social-cognitive (Cervone & Pervin, 2014).

McAdams and Pals (2006) integrated various approaches in personality psychology and presented a proposal which combined the benefits of this field within various trends. They distinguished three levels of personality: temporally and situationally consistent dispositional traits, i.e. individual differences in behaviour, thoughts and feelings (the first level); characteristic adaptations, i.e. more specific, context-dependent and modifiable motivational, social-cognitive and developmental variables, e.g. goals, values, coping styles, and schemas (the second level); integrative life narratives (the third level). These are internalized and developed life stories, containing both reconstruction of the past and visualisation of the future, which constitute the identity of the individual. At this level, the authors also placed individual differences with respect to characteristic images, tones, themes, plots and endings. Life stories may change over time, reflecting personality development (McAdams and Pals, 2006).

In this article personality will be considered according to trait theories. Personality traits refer to consistent patterns of behaviours, feelings, and thoughts of individuals. The trait concept have two assumptions: consistency (an individual should behave similarly across different situations related to a given trait) and distinctiveness (there are significant differences in traits between people; they all have the same features, but in different intensities) (Cervone & Pervin, 2014). This approach to personality relates to the first level of personality in McAdams and Pals’ (2006) model.

One of the most famous personality models is the Five-Factor Model of Personality (McCrae & Costa, 1987, 2003), which includes the following traits: neuroticism (a tendency to experience unpleasant and disturbing emotions, e.g. anxiety and anger), extraversion (a proneness to engage in social experiences and lively activity; this dimension also includes positive emotions), openness to experience (a receptiveness to new ideas, approaches and experiences; individuals with high scores on this dimension are original, imaginative, daring and have broad interests), agreeableness (a selfless concern for others and in trusting and generous sentiments) and conscientiousness (a dimension representing organization and achievements; Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1987, 2003).

The above mentioned Five-Factor Model of Personality constitutes a part of the personality system proposed by McCrae and Costa (1999, 2003). The personality system includes basic tendencies (Big Five traits), characteristic adaptations (personal striving, attitudes) and self-concept (self-schemas, personal myths). McCrae et al. (McCrae et al., 2000; Cervone & Pervin, 2014) postulate that Big Five personality traits have a strong biological basis. Authors compare personality traits to temperament and claim that they are independent of environmental influences. Although this claim has been criticized (Cervone & Pervin, 2014), it cannot be denied that personality traits can contribute to characteristic adaptations and self-concept. It is worth noting that McAdams and Pals (2006) also distinguish three levels of personality with dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations and integrative life narratives. These models have some common aspects and emphasize that dispositional traits like Big Five are on the base level of personality.

Personality traits and autobiographical memory

Personality traits and AM seem to be distant constructs. The former is stable over time, whereas the latter has a dynamic structure. Nevertheless, it is worth combining both constructs in research, because they may be associated.

Referring to McAdams and Pals proposal (2006), personality traits are located at the first level of their personality model. Aspects related to the AM are positioned on the second and on the third. It is worth emphasizing that personality traits may predispose to specific goals, patterns and motivations from the second level, and topics and threads from the third level. According to McCrae and Costa model (1999, 2003), basic tendencies can also shape self-concept, including self-schemas. In turn, self-schemas are one of the elements of SMS (Conway et al., 2004; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). It is possible that personality traits modulate the relationship between the long-term self and the working self and, consequently, modulate the search of the AM and the inclusion of new memories into it.

Thus, personality traits may be associated with characteristics of AM, but the direction of the relationship between these two constructs remains a separate issue. Perhaps it is unidirectional, as postulated by McCrae and Costa (1999, 2003), but some influences in the other direction are also possible. However, McAdams (1994; McAdams and Pals, 2006), who included life stories in the personality model, indicates that it is easiest to notice significant personality changes at this level.

The second reason for researching personality traits and AM is that both relate to emotions. The role of emotions in AM has been discussed previously. On the other hand, two personality traits, neuroticism and extraversion, by definition refer to emotions. Neuroticism is characterized by experiencing a whole range of negative emotions, while one of the components of extraversion are positive emotions (Costa & McCrae, 1992, 2003).

Given that personality traits can modulate remembering and recalling of events, it can be expected that neuroticism and extraversion will be most important traits. Research on the Big Five and characteristics of AM seems to confirm this assumption.

AM and neuroticism

Research linking AM and personality traits pays most attention to neuroticism. Data are coherent in showing that high neuroticism is linked with a tendency to remember negative events (e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Denkova, Dolcos & Dolcos, 2012; Blagov et al., 2020) and to create narrations filled in by negative emotions like sadness, anger or anxiety (McAdams et al., 2004; Hirsh & Peterson, 2009).

Much less is known about other characteristics of memories in highly neurotic people. For example, Sutin (2008) showed that neuroticism is related not only with a negative valence of memories, but also with the intensity of emotions linked with the events, what is apparent in PTSD. Rubin, Boals and Berntsen (2008) demonstrated that people with high levels of PTSD symptoms have at the same time high degrees of neuroticism. They perceive various kinds of events as more intensive, accessible and important for life history, as compared to people with low levels of PTSD symptoms. Rubin, Dennis and Beckham (2011) claim that memory accessibility is determined by three cognitive-affective mechanisms: emotional intensity, frequency of recall, and the memory’s central place in life history and personal identity. The authors suggest that those mechanisms reinforce each other and that they are influenced by neuroticism. The latter has been confirmed by Ogle and collaborators (2017).

On the other hand, there is some evidence that highly neurotic people suppress emotions linked with life events, which may worsen their AM. Rubin and Siegler (2004) demonstrated, for example, that neuroticism is not related to the phenomenological properties of memories, assessed by questionnaires, including experiencing emotions related to the event. Other data show that avoiding thinking about intrusive events and suppressing the expression of emotions result in a weaker memory for details of the events. For example, Richards and Gross (2000) showed that people who have suppressed the expression of negative emotions during watching a film clip and slides, have remembered less details from the presented material than people who haven’t suppressed the expression of emotions. Similarly, people who have a tendency to suppress the expression of emotions in everyday life, have worse scores in AM tests. Denkova, Dolcos and Dolcos (2012) observed that neuroticism positively correlates with the suppression of emotion expression and both of them predict negative memories in women. On the other hand, individuals who engage in cognitive reappraisal, remember negative events better and these memories are less harmful, thus reframing experiences helps twice (Williams et al., 2022).

Research data on disorders to which neuroticism predisposes, e.g. depression and PTSD, may shed some light on the relationship between neuroticism and AM. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) emphasize that autobiographical memories can take extreme forms in various types of clinical disorders. Among them PTSD and clinical depression are of interest, because in the first case the memories are vivid, while in the second one, they are impoverished. Researchers explain that a key feature of traumatic events is that they present a threat to current goals and plans. The working self cannot adapt to this threat, resulting in amnesia of the traumatic event or difficulties in integrating the event with the autobiographical knowledge base, which result in intrusive, vivid memories.

On the other hand, a growing body of research refers to reduced autobiographical memory specificity (rAMS) or overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM). These phenomena consists in recalling of general, rather than specific¹, events in reaction to key words differing in valence. It is observed mainly in people with depression and/or PTSD (e.g. Sumner et al., 2010; Hallford et al., 2021). Nowadays the most widely adopted model explaining OGM is the one proposed by Williams et al. (2007). It states that capture and rumination, functional avoidance, and impaired executive capacities (CaR-FA-X) are the three mechanisms responsible for OGM. This conception refers to the self-memory system, postulated by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000). Capture and rumination means restraining recall at a general level and ruminating about general self-opinions. Taking into account the self-memory system, individuals suffering from depression are probably captured on the level of abstract negative self-schemas they have. These schemas hinder memory search process, rather than help them (Williams et al., 2007). Functional avoidance consists in avoiding thinking about details of unpleasant events. It might be a form of emotion regulation, and its goal is not to experience negative emotions. Apart from that, OGM might be due to weaker executive functions, especially those related to the inhibition of irrelevant information and to the functioning of working memory that may impede the recall of a specific event. In the recent years, much research has been conducted to verify the model, but the results are equivocal. The role of rumination is well documented (Sumner, 2012), but rumination-state seems to be more important that rumination-trait (Chiu et al., 2018). It has also been observed that functional avoidance manifests itself only in some situations – for example in the case apprehension of recall of painful memories (Debeer et al., 2011). Furthermore, data show that avoidance of painful details of events directly after the experience may decrease the distress associated with it in short term. Probably avoidance becomes disadvantageous when it is applied to all situations and transformed into a general retrieval style (Sumner, 2012). Longitudinal research is needed in order to check how such style may develop.

^{1. Specific events last less than one day, whereas general events last longer or encompass a class of similar, repeated events (Williams et al., 2007).}

A recent transdiagnostic meta-analysis has compared individuals with psychiatric diagnoses and diagnoses-free people in specificity of AM (Barry, Hallford & Takano, 2021). This meta-analysis took into account variables related to participants (e.g. demographic variables, diagnostic categories), variables related to measurement (e.g. kind of instruction², time to recall the event) and process variables (for example rumination and other variables refering to CaR-FA-X model). Results have shown large differences in the specificity of AM between people with and without diagnosis. Moreover, psychiatric participants recall less specific memories when they have less time to retrieve a memory (30 seconds versus 60 seconds). This finding suggests, that people with diagnosis need more time to retrieve a memory and this may be caused by impaired executive capacity. It provides some support for the CaR-FA-X model, although process variables did not differentiate groups (Barry, Hallford & Takano, 2021).

^{2. The traditional instruction emphasizes that participant should recall specific event for each cue word and examples of specific and non-specific answers are given. In the “minimal instruction” condition participants are asked to recall memories for cue words, but without the indication that the memory should be specific (Deeber et al., 2009).}

It is worth noting that although the meta-analysis has found large differences between people with and without diagnosis, there were no differences between people representing different diagnostic categories. It provides some support for the transdiagnostic nature of memory specificity with one exception: anxiety disorders. People from that category of disorders did not express fewer specific autobiographical memories. The authors suggest that these effects may be explained by the heterogeneity between disorders included within this category (Barry, Hallford & Takano, 2021), but it is not the only one possible explanation. Another meta-analysishas revealed that individuals with high level of anxiety have more detailed/vivid future thinking in an negative emotional context and less detailed or vivid future thinking in an positive emotional context. However, there was no relation between anxiety disorders and specificity (Du, Hallford & Busby Grant, 2022). Although the specificity of memories and the amount of episodic details (e.g. who, what, where) are often positively correlated, it is possible to recall non-specific but more detailed memories as well as specific, but less detailed memory (see Barry et al., 2022, for review). In addition, more detailed memories of highly self-relevant events may predict an increase in depressive symptoms (Kyung et al., 2016; Salmon et al., 2021). Moreover, Kuyng et al. (2016) have observed that people with more detailed memories are more prone to ruminate and are more emotionally reactive. Barry et al. (2022) suggest that this effect may be observed in people with relatively low levels of depression symptoms, because the studies discussed above included participants without a diagnosis of depression. It is interesting that rumination, which participates in reduced specificity, at the same time may be associated with higher detailedness. It is plausible that ruminations lead to higher detailedness in initial phases of depression, but later predicts reduced specificity. It is possible that individual differences, e.g. personality traits, participate in such processes.

Kohler et al. (2015) suggest that neuroticism may be a mediator between non-adaptive memory strategies and depression, but research on OGM with neurotic people does not always confirm it. For example, Roberts et al. (2006) and Sumner et al. (2014) did not find relations between neuroticism and memory specificity. Blagov et colleagues (2020) observed very weak negative correlations between neuroticism and specificity, but only for positive self-defining memories. Kuyken and Dalgleish (2011) detected such a relation, which, however, was mediated by symptoms of depression. Probably in neurotic people without disorders, as compared to depressed, similar memory effects may appear, but they may be weaker. Perhaps more information about neurotic people’s AM could be gained thank to a more detailed examination of phenomena such as OGM. For example, Debeer et al. (2009) observed that the change of test instructions to reduced memory specificity contributes to more accurate detection of OGM in non-clinical samples.

Other controversies concerning neurotic people’s AM appear in research devoted to its functions, i.e., why do we retrieve memories. Literature offers two main models of memories functions. The first one origins from cognitive psychology and postulates three broad functions of AM: self, social and directive (Bluck & Alea, 2002, 2011; Bluck et al., 2005). The second refers to the Butler’s (1963) concept of life review and describes eight specific functions: boredom reduction, death preparation, identity, problem solving, conversation, intimacy maintenance, bitterness revival and teach/inform (Webster, 1993, 1997). There are some similarities between both models. The self function resembles identity function and death preparation, directive refers to problem solving and social to conversation, teach/inform and intimacy maintenance. Boredom reduction and bitterness revival do not have equivalents in the three-functions model (Bluck & Alea, 2002).

Data are congruent in showing that neuroticism is linked with the bitterness revival function, i.e., mind refreshment of situations when one felt badly treated (e.g., Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Fernandez-Perez et. al., 2020). Also a relation between neuroticism and identity/self functions has been observed (e.g., Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Alea, Bluck & Ali, 2015). The goals of identity functions’ are to maintain the feeling of being the same person in spite of time passage and changing circumstances, and to clarify who one is. Those functions usually accompany good adaptation (e.g., Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2006; Waters, 2014), so it is hard to explain their relation with neuroticism. They may both result from hard-to-control rumination tendencies and be an attempt to recover a feeling of continuity which can be more adaptive. Teasdale and Green (2004) suggest that neurotic people ruminate about difficulties in order to resolve the discrepancy between the actual and desired state. This process proceeds probably inefficiently, because high neurotic people may have less integrative self-defining memories than low neurotic (Blagov et al., 2020). Vanaken et al. (2021) point out that maladaptive patterns of remembering, including nonspecific and incoherent memories, may hinder to use adaptative memory functions. Meanwhile, individuals with high scores in neuroticism often use maladaptive reminiscence functions and avoidance coping styles (Fernandez-Perez et. al., 2020)

AM and extraversion

Regarding the relations between AM and extraversion, some data suggest that the latter is linked with positive memories or less negative content (e.g., Sutin & Robins, 2005; Denkova et al., 2012), but other date do not (e.g., McAdams et al., 2004; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Perhaps, in the case of extraversion the meaning of the event is more important than its emotional valence. For example Baddeley and Singer (2008) observed that high extraverts produced non-adaptive narratives, in which initial positive events change into negative ones less often. Furthermore, research on AM functions has showed that extraversion is most often linked with social functions, i.e., the usage of memories to start and maintain social relationships (e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Bluck & Alea, 2011). This is not surprising; extraverts are described as people who are sociable, fun loving, sensitive, friendly and talkative (McCrea & Costa, 1987).

AM and other Big Five traits

Regarding the other Big Five personality traits, some relations were also observed for openness to experience. Research has demonstrated that openness is primarily linked with such phenomenological properties of memories as vividness, reliving, coherence and the centrality of the event for identity (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Ausmees, Realo &Allik, 2022). More interesting data concerned the relations with AM functions. Openness to experience appeared to be linked with identity type memories (e.g., Cappeliez & O’Rourke, 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010), as well as with memories directing actual behavior and problem solving (Molinari et al., 2001; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010). Furthermore, Teasdale and Green (2004) have found that high openness to experience predicts reflective self-focus, and Baddeley and Singer (2008) observed that mourning people with high openness produced narrations helping a post-traumatic growth. McAdams and collaborators (2004) state that openness is especially important for the development of life narration, and, as the most cognitively oriented trait, it may influence the way people assign meaning to their lives.

Less research has dealt with conscientiousness and agreeableness. Some data has shown that they are positively correlated with the positive emotional tone of narrations and memories (McAdams et al., 2004; Sutin, 2008; Sutin & Robins, 2005).

Discussion

Although personality traits and AM seem to be distant constructs, the former may predispose to the occurrence of certain tendencies in remembering and recalling events from the individual's life. Nevertheless, the picture of relationship between personality traits and AM is still equivocal.

With respect to neuroticism, the results are rather consistent in showing that people with a high level of neuroticism generally recall negative events that are usually filled with negative emotions. Much less is known about other mechanisms of AM in such people. It is likely that they try to suppress emotions related with the events, what does not weaken emotions but results in worse recall of details. It may be that they ruminate around negative events, striving to avoid re-emergence of painful details. On the one hand, this makes negative events more accessible, with the unprocessed emotions still present; on the other, details of the events are forgotten.

The above hypothesis still requires empirical verification. It must be emphasized that conclusions as to neurotic people AM are often drawn from research with people suffering from disorders to which neuroticism predisposes, such as PTSD and depression. Although it is probable that mechanisms in neurotics and in persons with such disorders are similar, more research is needed with regard to healthy people with different levels of neuroticism.

Focusing on memories that are important and unimportant for the self represents an interesting direction for the investigation of AM in neurotics. On the one hand, it would seem that memories important for the identity formation should be more accessible (e.g., Rubin et al., 2011); on the other, such memories might be less specific because the person will ruminate around general self-opinions, as postulated by the CaR-FA-X model (Williams et al., 2007). However, Sumner et al. (2011) have demonstrated that people with a high tendency to ruminate recalled general memories for key-words unimportant to the self, and more specific memories for words important for the self. Once neurotic people’s tendency to recall memories serving identity functions (e.g., Alea et al., 2015) is considered, some questions require clarification. We still do not know whether neurotic people’s memories are less specific, and, if so, whether this concerns events that are important for the self or threatening to the self³, or rather events that are less important. Another question is whether neurotic people who retrieve memories for identity purposes do it in order to restore a sense of self-continuity, which is adaptive, or whether this is a result of non-adaptive ruminations that are difficult to control. In that context, one should control the valence of the memories linked and not linked with identity because although neurotic people remember more negative events, it is not certain whether the memories linked with one’s own identity are most negative.

^{3. For example Marchlewska and Cichocka (2017) observed that narcissists with a low self-esteem avoid reminding self-threatening (shameful) events from a first- person perspective, but tend to remind them from a third-person perspective. Still it is unclear whether such distancing helps to liberate from threatening events or makes them more accessible. Sutin and Robins (2008) emphasize that memories of shame or pride experiences are particularly important in the context of self-relevant events.}

AM should be investigated in more detailed manner. With regard to the emotional intensity, not only self-description measures are needed, but physiological too. It is possible, that people high in neuroticism suppress negative emotions at the cognitive level, but they cannot decrease arousal at the physiological level. In research on OGM, not only the valence of key words should be varied, but also their intensity or importance for the self (which was taken into account, for example, by Sumner et al., 2011). Apart from key-words, other methods should be used, such as collecting samples of memories which are most frequently recalled and their properties should be analyzed.

Lastly, research should take into account not only isolated traits, but also their configuration. Garcia and Siddiqui (2009), investigating people with various affective temperaments (Norlander et al., 2002), demonstrated that only people with a high level of negative (NA) and a low level of positive affect (PA) remember more negative than positive events as compared to people with high levels of both affects. NA and PA are sometimes compared to neuroticism and extraversion (Larsen & Katelaar, 1991), so one may assume that neurotic people’s memories may vary as a function of their level of extraversion. The lack of control for other personality traits may be responsible for equivocal results.

In future research on AM, the distinction between temperament and personality traits should be considered. Psychologists do not agree which of those are primary. With respect to temperament, the biological foundation is emphasized (Rothbart, Ahadi & Evans, 2000), what is confirmed by genetical data. Kandler et al. (2012), in their investigation of the genetic basis of the Big Five and RTT (Strelau, 2008) traits, found a significant contribution of the genetic factor only to neuroticism and extraversion in the case of personality, but to the majority of temperament traits. It is worth emphasizing that neuroticism and extraversion have the greatest importance for AM. This means that traits most strongly conditioned by biology manifest themselves most clearly in the recall of memories with specific properties and functions. For example, Olszak and Czerniawska (2021) revealed that participants with high emotional reactivity – the trait similar to neuroticism - recall few events and their recollections are mostly negative and non-specific. Nevertheless, works linking temperament and AM are very rare and more research is needed to fill this gap.

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