Dariusz Drążkowski Theoretical and empirical foundations of three types of Self-Construal

Artykuł jest dostępny na warunkach międzynarodowej licencji 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

Introduction 

In the literature on the subject, many terms referring to self-construal can be found, such as aspects of self (Triandis, 1989); aspects of self-concept (Markus, Kitayama, 1991); ways of constructing the self (Pilarska, 2014); perspectives on thinking about self-concept (Oyserman, Elmore, Smith, 2012); levels of self-representation (Brewer, Gardner, 1996); different self-images (Singelis, 1994). The broadest perspective on the concept of self-construal is presented by Cross, Hardin and Gercek-Swing (2011). For them, self-construal refers to how individuals define themselves and give meaning to their self. In turn, Oyserman, Elmore and Smith (2012) treat self-construal as cognitive structures of self-representation that are organized around various areas, e.g. relationships with other people. 

The concept of self-construal has gained popularity since Markus and Kitayama (1991) identified it as central to explaining psychological differences between Westerners (USA, Europe) and Easterners (Asia). Subsequently, this concept began to be used to explain many psychological phenomena within cultures, such as differences between masculinity and femininity (Cross, Madson, 1997). Self-construal also began to be used to study individual differences, pointing to their dispositional determinants (Singelis, 1994). In turn, research using priming methods has shown that the situation in which individuals find themselves may influence which self-construal will dominate at a given moment (Trafimow, Triandis, Goto, 1991; cf. Drążkowski, 2019). Regardless of the method of examining the concept of self-construal, the vast majority of studies distinguish two types. This approach was initiated by Markus and Kitayama, who among the “catalogue of all types of self-construal” (1991, p. 225) distinguished an independent and interdependent.

Since 1991, over 1,800 studies have been published that tested these two types of self-construal. In many of these studies, inconsistent results were obtained, questioning the validity of distinguishing two of them. Despite this, in the literature on the subject, the division into the construal of the independent and interdependent self is still dominant. Therefore, the main goal of this article is to provide an empirical and theoretical justification for distinguishing three types of self-construal, which, as will be shown, are better suited to the empirical data than the independent and interdependent self-construal. The article will describe the concept of the independent and interdependent self by Markus and Kitayama (1991), which was integrated with the model of three levels of self-representation by Brewer and Gardner (1996), illustrating both concepts of the self-structure with specific examples and an original graphic presentation. Due to the lack of works in the Polish literature that would attempt to synthetically integrate both concepts of self-structure, this article may have educational value for Polish readers, presenting a historically important and fruitful period of research (mainly works from 1991–2013) on self-construal.

The concept of the independent and interdependent self 

For Markus and Kitayama (1991), self-construal is among the most general and overarching self-schemas of the self-system, which regulate and organize the degree to which an individual’s cognitive representations of the self (including self-schemas) are separated from or connected to the cognitive representations of significant others (cf. Markus, Wurf, 1987). According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), culture determines what dominant type of self-construal an individual has. Therefore, their approach refers to people with a dominant independent self-construal coming from Western countries and people with a dominant interdependent self-construal coming from Eastern countries. The source of the distinction between independent and interdependent self-construal is the difference in motives and goals relating to the nature of the relationships connecting the individual with his or her social environment (Pilarska, 2012a).  

People from Western countries with a dominant independent type of self-construal organize their self-representations in a way that is separate from the cognitive representations of other people, therefore they perceive themselves as autonomous, unique and separate from other people. For Markus and Kitayama (1991, p. 226), the independent type of self-construal characterizes “individuals whose behavior is organized and directed primarily about their internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than in relation to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of other people”. The motivation of people with the independent self-construct is driven by the desire to express important aspects of the self-used to define themselves and their internal attributes, as well as the pursuit of autonomy and differentiation from other people.  

In turn, people from Eastern countries with a dominant interdependent self-construal organize their self-representations in connection with the cognitive representations of other people, which is why they share the attributes of these people. In people with interdependent self-construal, some of the subjectively most important self-schemas that determine how an individual defines his or her identity are therefore related to the representations of other, significant people. People with a dominant interdependent self-construal tend to cognitively integrate and assimilate the representations of other, significant people into their self-concept and emphasize their similarity to other people (Cross, Bacon, Morris, 2000). Therefore, people with an interdependent self-construal behave in a way that is consistent with the thoughts, feelings and actions of close people (Markus, Kitayama, 1991). People with interdependent self-construal are motivated by the desire to strengthen and support relationships and connections with other people, the desire to adjust their behavior to the behavior of other people, and the desire to meet other people’s expectations. 

Later research on the concept of the independent and interdependent self began to show an inconsistent picture of the results, which became the basis for revising this theory. 

Criticism of the concept of the independent and interdependent self 

Markus and Kitayama’s concept did not meet the empirical data. It turned out that in many studies, Americans had a more dominant interdependent self-construal than the Japanese (e.g., Kleinknecht et al., 1997; Sato, Cameron, 1999). A review of the literature on the subject led Matsumoto (1999) to the conclusion that Westerners do not have a more dominant independent self-construal compared to Easterners, who in turn do not have a more dominant interdependent self-construal compared to Westerners. On this basis, Matsumoto (1999) rejected the validity of the claim that self-construal is culturally determined. In turn, the results of a meta-analysis conducted on a group of over four thousand people from different cultures showed that Easterners, compared to Westerners, represent a lower level of intensity of the independent self-construal and the same level of intensity of the interdependent self-construal (Levine et al., 2003). Therefore, the results of this study indicate that although the assumptions of Markus and Kitayama (1991) were confirmed in the case of independent self-construal, this was not the case with interdependent self-construal. 

The need to revise the concept of the independent and interdependent self also resulted from cross-cultural research on individualism and collectivism, which are considered attributes of cultures (e.g. Hofstede, 1980) and individuals (e.g. Triandis, 1989; Oyserman, Coon, Kemmelmeier, 2002). The construct of the independent self is often treated by researchers as an indicator of individualism, and the construct of the interdependent self as an indicator of collectivism (e.g. Oyserman, Lee, 2008). Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) conducted a meta-analysis comparing differences in individualism and collectivism between the United States and Eastern countries. These researchers used, among others, the independent and interdependent self-construal as indicators of individualism and collectivism. These constructs were measured using a scale developed by Singelis (1994), who combined the concept of the independent and interdependent self (Markus, Kitayama, 1991) with the concept of individualism-collectivism (Triandis, 1989) to examine individual differences in self-construal. The results of their meta-analysis showed that Americans of European descent are more individualistic than Asians, but they are not less collectivistic. Therefore, although individualism as a dimension of intercultural differences is not controversial, collectivism, according to some researchers, is not a uniform concept. 

Further arguments questioning the distinction between two types of self-construal come from the factor analysis of the mentioned Singelis scale (1994), the results of which showed the multidimensional structure of this tool. Analyzes conducted by Hardin and her colleagues (2004) showed that the Singelis scale consists of six factors – four related to the independent self-construal (autonomy/assertiveness, individualism, self-primacy and behavioral coherence) and two related to the interdependent self-construal (group self-esteem) and relational interdependence). This six-factor scale structure has been replicated in studies involving people from different cultures. Sato and McCann (1998), analyzing the internal structure of Singelis’s (1994) scale, distinguished four factors: autonomy, achievement, attachment and sensitivity. However, Fiske (2002) identified four subtypes of interdependent self-construal and ten subtypes of independent self-construal. The above-mentioned studies do not lead to a clear conclusion as to the number of factors that constitute the independent and interdependent self, but each of them supports doubts regarding the justification for distinguishing two types of self-construal.

Three types of self-construal 

Three independent lines of theoretical and research confirm that three types of self-construal are best suited to research results. The first line was initiated by the approach of Triandis (1989), who created a model of the private, public and collective self. The culmination of this line is the research of Kashima and Hardie (2000), who distinguished three separate self-constructs: individualistic (divided into two subtypes: agentive and assertive), collective and relational. This line directly applies to cross-cultural comparisons and is rarely used in the context of individual differences. The second chronological line of research was initiated by Brewer and Gardner (1996), presenting a model of three levels of self-representation: individual, collective and relational. This model is used both in cross-cultural research (e.g. Brewer, Chen, 2007) and analyzed in the context of individual differences (e.g. Gaertner et al., 2012). The third line of research was initiated by Cross, Bacon and Morris (2000), who distinguished two subtypes of interdependent self-construal: collective-interdependent and relational-interdependent. The second line of research on distinguishing three types of self-construal is the most developed in the literature on the subject (Oyserman, Lee, 2008), therefore it will be discussed in more detail later in the article.

A model of three levels of self-representation 

Brewer and Gardner (1996), constructing the theoretical basis for the model of three levels of self-representation, concluded that the self-expansion model (Aron, Aron, Norman, 2004; cf. Doroszewicz, Gamian-Wilk, 2012) best explains how other people and groups social aspects can be included in the self at the relational and collective levels of self-representation. The self-expansion model assumes that the central motivation of a person is the expansion of the self and that the individual satisfies this motivation through close relationships that allow him to include other people and their properties within the self. The goal of self-expansion is to increase the potential effectiveness of activities through relationships with other people who can improve the achievement of the individual’s goals (Aron, Aron, Norman, 2004). When creating a close relationship, an individual gradually incorporates various aspects of the partner’s self: his/her features, self-knowledge content, social roles and views (Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001). Tropp and Wright (2001) extended the self-expansion model, which they called the self-group inclusion model, assuming the possibility of including the cognitive representation of social groups in the structure of the cognitive representation of the self. 

Brewer and Gardner, based on the self-expansion model, assumed that both close relationships and social groups can be included in the self. On this basis, the researchers concluded that an individual can incorporate cognitive representations of other people and groups into his or her self-concept. These two types of incorporation have been separated from each other and defined as the relational and collective levels of self-representation, which function independently of the individual level of self-representation. The ability to integrate cognitive representations of other objects supports the existence of common cognitive mechanisms for the relational self and the collective self: susceptibility to the influence of context, the inclusion of other objects (close people or groups) in the information processing process, tendency to cognitive assimilation and search for similarities.

Empirical support for the three levels of the self-representation model 

The identification of three levels of self-representation has brought interesting implications for research relating to cross-cultural differences in self-construal. 

Brewer and Chen (2007) used the three levels of the self-representation model in their research on individualism and collectivism. In their opinion, the heterogeneity of collectivism results from the fact that it includes the relational and collective level of self-representation. According to the theoretical assumptions of collectivism, the division into the in-group and the out-group should be more important in countries with a collectivist culture (Eastern) than in countries with an individualistic culture (Western) (Brewer, Chen, 2007). Nevertheless, the research results demonstrated inverse relationships. For example, soccer fans in Japan exhibit less in-group bias compared to American fans (Snibbe et al., 2003). In turn, Bond and Hewstone (1988) showed that British students in Hong Kong had a more positive in-group image than Chinese students. Other studies have shown that out-group discrimination has a different basis in Eastern countries than predicted by social identity theory (Tajfel, Turner, 1979). In Eastern countries, out-group discrimination appears to be aimed at maintaining mutually beneficial relationships with members of the in-group that can contribute to personal gain, rather than being aimed at enabling the in-group to positively distinguish itself from the out-group (Yamagishi, Jin, Kiyonari, 1999). 

The results of the described cross-cultural research support the separation of three types of self-construal to explain the observed differences between residents of Western and Eastern countries. Brewer and Chen (2007) note that these differences reflect differences between the three levels of self-representation. Isolating these three types of self-construal allows for the integration of research results which indicate that in individualistic cultures, collective content (e.g. nationality) is more often observed in the self-descriptions of representatives of these cultures than in the self-descriptions of representatives of collectivistic cultures. However, in collectivistic cultures, self-reports referring to specific relationships (e.g. a friend) or small groups (e.g. family) are more often used. Thus, the relational self is more prevalent in Easterners, and the collective self is more prevalent in Westerners. 

The research results of Yuki and colleagues (2005) well illustrate the differences between the relational self and the collective self in the context of comparisons between the West and the East. Researchers have shown that Americans trust a stranger to the extent that that person belongs to a common social category. However, the Japanese trust a stranger to the extent that this person has a direct relationship with them or a relationship mediated by another close person. Therefore, just as the relational self differs from the collective self, collectivism is expressed differently in Western and Eastern cultures. According to Yuki (2011), East Asian collectivism is based on intra-group bonds, cooperation between group members and maintaining harmony in relationships with other members of the in-group. Therefore, the inhabitants of East Asia perceive their own group through the prism of the relational self, i.e. as a set of networks of mutual connections among members of their group. Western collectivism, on the other hand, is expressed in division into categories: the in-group and the out-group. Brewer and Roccas (2001) believe that in Western cultures, intergroup comparison and abstract categories are the basis for constructing social identity, while in Eastern cultures this basis is cooperation and maintaining harmony in relationships and cohesion with the group. Therefore, it is justified to distinguish relational collectivism (relational self) from group collectivism (collective self). 

The distinction between the collective self and the relational self has brought interesting implications for research on gender differences in self-construal. The results of studies testing independent and interdependent selves indicated that women score higher on scales measuring interdependence than men (Cross, Madson, 1997). However, research conducted by Gabriel and Gardner (1999) showed that women receive higher scores in the relational self than men, who in turn receive higher scores in the collective self and individual self compared to women (cf. Cross, Bacon, Morris, 2000). Moreover, the collective self positively correlates with tools measuring the level of masculinity (Gabriel, Gardner, 1999).

A model of the motivational hierarchy of three self-construal 

In parallel to research supporting the validity of distinguishing three types of self-construal, research teams led by Sedikides and Gaertner conducted research (Gaertner, Sedikides, Graetz, 1999; Gaertner et al., 2002; Gaertner et al., 2012; Sedikides et al., 2013), the aim of which was to determine which types of self-construal are most central to human experience and most strongly motivate an individual’s actions. Their research has shown, among other things, that people react with stronger emotions to the successes and failures of the individual self than to the collective self (Gaertner, Sedikides, Graetz, 1999; Gaertner et al., 2002) and that they more often psychologically distance themselves from threats to the relational self than to the collective self. (Gaertner et al., 2012). Moreover, these differences were observed regardless of whether the subjects came from Eastern or Western countries. Based on the results of these studies, Sedikides and Gaertner developed a model of the motivational hierarchy of three self-constructs, in which they assumed that the motivational structure of the self-concept is arranged hierarchically, with the primacy of the individual self, which has a higher status than the relational self, which in turn dominates over the collective self (Sedikides et al., 2013). In their opinion, the individual self is the motivational core of the self-concept, regulating the remaining representations of the self, relational and collective. 

Integration of the model of three levels of self-representation with the concept of independent and interdependent self 

Brewer and Gardner (1996), initially describing the three-level self-representation model, did not directly relate their approach to Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) concept of the independent and interdependent self. Only subsequent works in this area integrated the model of three levels of self-representation with this concept (Brewer, Chen, 2007; Oyserman, Lee, 2008; Cross, Hardin, Gercek-Swing, 2011). This integrated approach is presented below with original examples and illustrations. 

Individual self 

At the individual level, the individuals define themselves uniquely and autonomously. This level of self-representation includes features that distinguish an individual from other people – the individual self reflects his or her uniqueness. Therefore, Brewer and Gardner (1996) included at this level the construct of the independent self by Markus and Kitayama (1991) and personal identity derived from social identity theory (Tajfel, Turner, 1979). People with a dominant individual self answer the question “Who am I?” in terms of individual characteristics that are stable over time (e.g. “I am creative”, “I am witty”) or that are characteristics in common with other people (e.g. “I am nice like my mother”, “I am brave like all the players on my team”) (Cross, Hardin, Gercek-Swing, 2011). From this perspective, other people are a source of interpersonal comparisons, providing a point of reference to confirm the uniqueness of the individual. 

Figure 1 presents the conceptual model of the independent self from the work of Markus and Kitayama (1991). The largest circle represents the self, and the smaller circles represent cognitive representations of other people (mother, friend, daughter). The original model was enriched with cognitive representations of the prototypical representative of the in-group (women, Europeans, Polish women), which will enable subsequent discussion of the collective self. The X signifies various aspects of cognitive representations of self, other people and groups. Bolded In the case of people with a dominant individual self (independent self-construal), self-schemas are separate and independent from cognitive representations of other people and groups. 

Figure 1. Conceptual representation of the individual self

Based on: Markus, Kitayama, 1991, p. 226. 

The relational self 

People with a dominant relational self construct their self as fundamentally connected to other people and define themselves through relationships with them (Cross, Hardin, Gercek-Swing, 2011). At the relational level, the self is defined in the context of direct contact with close people (e.g. parents, partner), the roles played in these contacts (son, husband) and relationships with them (e.g. parenthood, marriage), which largely corresponds to the interdependent self-construal of Markus and Kitayama (1991). Other people provide the basis for self-definition (e.g., “I am an aggressive player on my team and a devoted friend”) (Cross, Hardin, Gercek-Swing, 2011). The relational self reflects the needs and expectations of other people with whom the individual is in a relationship. At this level of self-representation, there are relational identities that are created based on intimate, two-way relationships (e.g. marriage, friendship, mother-child relationship) and membership in small social groups where direct contact between all members is possible and relationships can be presented as a network of connections (e.g. members of a football team, school class). The relational self-construal defines roles in relationships and includes characteristics shared with other people that help distinguish an individual’s relationship with another person from other relationships (e.g., “we love each other more than that couple”) (Gaertner et al., 2012). Research by Gabriel, Renaud and Tippin (2007) confirmed that increasing the cognitive accessibility of the relational self influences individuals to include the features and attributes of close friends and family in their self-concept. The self-esteem of people with a dominant relational self is based on the proper fulfillment of social roles and the expectations of others. side of the relationship (mirroring). However, the source of self-esteem for such people is adapting to other members of their group, which prompts them to adjust their behavior and express emotions to maintain harmony in the group. For people with a dominant relational self, interpersonal relationships and their contribution to the well-being of others. Social comparisons are used to assess whether they meet the group’s expectations. 

Figure 2 presents the conceptual model of the interdependent self from the work of Markus and Kitayama (1991) as a model of the relational self. The scope of the larger circle with unclear boundaries (self scope) in people with a dominant relational self intersects with smaller pegs representing cognitive representations of others. Self-schemas (marked as X) located at this intersection refer to the representation of various aspects of other people included (incorporated) into the scope of the Self. These self-schemas refer to the representation of the self about other people or about a particular social relationship (e.g. “I am very nice in contact with my friend”). 

Figure 2. Conceptual representation of the relational self

Based on: Markus, Kitayama, 1991, p. 226.

The collective self 

Using the concept of the independent and interdependent self of Markus and Kitayama (1991), it can be stated that the collective self is expressed by including cognitive representations of prototypical representatives of the in-group in the self-concept. Just as cognitive representations of various aspects of others (e.g., mother) can be incorporated into the self-concept, so too can cognitive representations of various aspects of the in-group (e.g., the prototypical woman) be incorporated into the self-concept. At the collective level, the self is defined through the prism of prototypical features possessed by members of the group to which the individual belongs – the collective self is the result of assimilation of the representation of a prototypical member of the in-group (Roccas, Brewer, 2002). This level of self-representation reflects characteristics shared with in-group members that help distinguish the in-group from the out-group. At this level, direct contact or closeness with all members of the in-group, which often form an abstract category (e.g. men, Europeans), is not required. Therefore, the collective self is based on shared symbols of group membership and cognitive representations of the group as a whole, regardless of personal relationships with group members – the collective self includes depersonalized relationships with others expressed through shared membership in “symbolic groups” (Yuki, 2011). Self-esteem associated with the collective self is based on the status of the in-group, which results from favorable intergroup comparisons. At the collective level of self-representation, there are all of an individual’s social identities (Sedikides, Brewer, 2001; Brewer, Chen, 2007). People with a dominant collective self answer the question “Who am I?” by referring to membership in many groups (e.g. “I am a man, a Pole and a soccer player in my team”). 

As can be seen in Figure 3, in individuals with a dominant collective self, the scope of a larger circle with unclear boundaries (self scope) intersects with smaller pegs representing cognitive representations of prototypical in-group members. Self-schemas (marked as X) located at this intersection refer to the representation of various aspects of prototypical in-group representatives that are incorporated into the scope of the self. 

Figure 3. A conceptual representation of the collective self

Source: own study based on Markus, Kitayama, 1991, p. 226. 

Discussion 

The concept of self-constructs is of interest to a large number of researchers. The vast majority of them examine two types of construal, independent and interdependent (Markus, Kitayama, 1991). The article aimed to indicate the inconsistency of research results on the concept of the independent and interdependent self and to present theoretical and empirical justification for distinguishing three types of self-construal. A model of three levels of self-representation was presented (Brewer, Gardner, 1996), which distinguishes three types of self-construal: individual, relational and collective. The last two types of self-construal share common cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, in the case of many studies referring to these mechanisms, it will not matter whether they include the relational self or the collective self. However, in cross-cultural research, research testing gender differences, and research testing specific assumptions about close relationships or social groups, researchers should be aware of the differences between the relational self and the collective self. This article, thanks to its synthetic form and illustration of both concepts of the self- structure with specific examples and an original graphic presentation, creates an opportunity to increase this awareness for Polish researchers dealing with this issue. By describing the development of various theories of self-construal and the dynamics of research that tested them, conducted in 1991–2013, it was possible to present the context and justification for distinguishing three types of self-construal. 

Translated by Katarzyna Jenek

References 

Aron, A., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2001). Including others in the self: Extensions to own and partner’s group memberships. In C. Sedikides, & M.B. Brewer (Eds.), Individual self, relational self, collective self (pp. 89–108). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.  

Aron, A., Aron, E.N., & Norman, C. (2004). Self-expansion model of motivation and Cognition in Close Relationships and Beyond. In M. Brewer, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Self and Social Identity (pp. 99–123). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.  

Bond, M.H., & Hewstone, M. (1988). Social identity theory and the perception of intergroup relations in Hong Kong. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 12, 153–170, doi: 10.1016/0147-1767(88)90046-6 

Brewer, M.B., & Chen, Y.R. (2007). Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism. Psychological Review, 114, 133–151, doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.114.1.133 

Brewer, M.B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “We”? Levels of collective identity and self-representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 83–93, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.1.83  

Brewer, M.B., & Roccas, S. (2001). Individual values, social identity, and optimal distinctiveness. Psychology Press. In C. Sedikides, & M.B. Brewer (Eds.), Individual self, relational self, collective self (pp. 219–237). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.  

Cross, S.E., Bacon, P.L., & Morris, M.L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-construal and relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 791–808, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.78.4.791 

Cross, S.E., Hardin, E.E., & Gercek-Swing, B. (2011). The what, how, why, and where of self-construal. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(2), 142–179, doi: 10.1177/1088868310373752 

Cross, S.E., & Madson, L. (1997). Models of the self: Self-construals and gender. Psychological Bulletin, 122, 5–37, doi: 0033-2909/97/S3.00 

Doroszewicz, K., & Gamian-Wilk, M. (2012). Efekt Michała Anioła w bliskich związkach: czy rzeczywiście bliski partner może przyczyniać się do wzmacniania Ja idealnego swojej drugiej połowy? Psychologia Społeczna, 1, 7–20. 

Drążkowski, D. (2019). Psychologiczne mechanizmy torowania trzech konstruktów Ja. Czasopismo Psychologiczne, 25(1), 61–68, doi: 10.14691/CPPJ.25.1.61 

Fiske, A.P. (2002). Using individualism and collectivism to compare cultures—A critique of the validity and measurement of the constructs: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002). Psychological Bulletin, 128, 78–88, doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.128.1.78 

Gabriel, S., & Gardner, W.L. (1999). Are there “his” and “hers” types of interdependence? The implications of gender differences in collective versus relational interdependence for affect, behavior, and cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(3), 642–655, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.77.3.642 

Gabriel, S., Renaud, J.M., & Tippin, B. (2007). When I think of you, I feel more confident about me: The relational self and self-confidence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(5), 772–779, doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2006.07.004 

Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., & Graetz, K. (1999). In search of self-definition: Motivational primacy of the individual self, motivational primacy of the collective self, or contextual primacy? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(1), 5–18, doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.76.1.5 

Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., Luke, M., O’Mara, E.M., Iuzzini, J., Jackson, L.E., …, Wu, Q. (2012). A motivational hierarchy within: Primacy of the individual self, relational self, or collective self? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 997–1013, doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2012.03.009  

Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., Vevea, J.L., & Iuzzini, J. (2002). The “I,” the “we,” and the “when”: A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(3), 574–591, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.3.574 

Hardin, E.E., Leong, F.T., & Bhagwat, A.A. (2004). Factor Structure of the Self-Construal Scale Revisited: Implications for the Multidimensionality of Self-Construal. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 327–345, doi: 10.1177/0022022104264125 

Hofstede, G. (1980). Motivation, leadership, and organization: Do American theories apply abroad? Organizational Dynamics, 9, 42–63, doi: 10.1016/0090-2616(80)90013-3 

Hogg, M.A. (2001). Social identity and the sovereignty of the group: A psychology of belonging. In C. Sedikides, & M.B. Brewer (Eds.), Individual self, relational self, collective self (pp. 125–146). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.  

Kashima, E.S., & Hardie, E.A. (2000). The development and validation of the Relational, Individual, and Collective self‐aspects (RIC) Scale. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 19–48, doi: 10.1111/1467-839X.00053 

Kleinknecht, R.A., Dinnel, D.L., Kleinknecht, E.E., Hiruma, N., & Harada, N. (1997). Cultural factors in social anxiety: A comparison of social phobia symptoms and Taijin Kyofusho. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11, 157–177, doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(97)00004-2 

Levine, T.R., Bresnahan, M.J., Park, H.S., Lapinski, M.K., Wittenbaum, G.M., Shearman, S.M., …, Ohashi, R. (2003). Self‐construal scales lack validity. Human Communication Research, 29, 210–252, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2958.2003.tb00837.x 

Markus, H.R. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63–78, doi: /10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224 

Markus, H.R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224–253. 

Markus, H.R., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–337, doi: 0066-4308/87/0201-0299$02.00 

Matsumoto, D. (1999). Culture and self: An empirical assessment of Markus and Kitayama’s theory of independent and interdependent self-construals. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 289–310, doi: 10.1111/1467-839X.00042 

Oyserman, D., Coon, H.M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 3–72, doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.128.1.3 

Oyserman, D., Elmore, K., & Smith, G. (2012). Self, self-concept, and identity. Handbook of self and identity. In M.R. Leary, & J.P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 69–104). 2nd ed. New York: The Guilford Press.  

Oyserman, D., & Lee, S.W. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 311–342, doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.311 

Pilarska, A. (2012a). Ja i tożsamość a dobrostan psychiczny. Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNS UAM. 

Pilarska, A. (2012b). Eksperymentalna stymulacja konstruktu Ja – wnioski i refleksje z badań własnych. NAUKA, 3, 119–139. 

Pilarska, A. (2014). Self-construal as a mediator between identity structure and subjective well-being. Current Psychology, 33, 130–154, doi: 10.1007/s12144-013-9202-5 

Roccas, S., & Brewer, M.B. (2002). Social identity complexity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 88–106, doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0602_01 

Sato, T., & Cameron, J.E. (1999). The relationship between collective self-esteem and self-construal in Japan and Canada. The Journal of Social Psychology, 139, 426–435, doi: 10.1080/00224549909598402 

Sato, T., & McCann, D. (1998). Individual differences in relatedness and individuality: An exploration of two constructs. Personality and Individual Differences, 24, 847–859, doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00020-8 

Sedikides, C., & Brewer, M.B. (2001). Individual self, relational self and collective self Partners, Opponents, or Strangers? In C. Sedikides, & M.B. Brewer (Eds.), Individual self, relational self, collective self (pp. 1–6). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.  

Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., Luke, M.A., O’Mara, E.M., & Gebauer, J.E. (2013). A three-tier hierarchy of motivational self-potency: Individual self, relational self, collective self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 235–295, doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-407188-9.00005-3 

Singelis, T.M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 580–591, doi: 10.1177/0146167294205014 

Snibbe, A.C., Kitayama, S., Markus, H.R., & Suzuki, T. (2003). They saw a game: A Japanese and American (football) field study. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 34, 581–595, doi: 10.1177/0022022103256480 

Tajfel, H., & Turner J.C. (1979). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In W.G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey: Brooks/Cole.  

Trafimow, D., Triandis, H.C., & Goto, S.G. (1991). Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 649–655, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.60.5.649 

Triandis, H.C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. Psychological Review, 96, 506–520, doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.96.3.506 

Tropp, L.R., & Wright, S.C. (2001). Ingroup identification as the inclusion of ingroup in the self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 585–600, doi: 10.1177/0146167201275007 

Yamagishi, T., Jin, N., & Kiyonari, T. (1999). Bounded generalized reciprocity: Ingroup boasting and ingroup favoritism. Advances in Group Processes, 16, 161–197.  

Yuki, M. (2011). Intragroup relationships and intergroup comparisons as two sources of group-based collectivism. In R.M. Kramer, G.J. Leonardelli, & R.W. Livingston (Eds.), Social cognition, social identity, and intergroup relations: A festschrift in honor of Marilynn Brewer (pp. 247–266). New York: Taylor & Francis.  

Yuki, M., Maddux, W.W., Brewer, M.B., & Takemura, K. (2005). Cross-cultural differences in relationship-and group-based trust. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 48–62, doi: 10.1177/0146167204271305